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This paper analyzes the cyclical effects of bank capital 
requirements in a simple model with credit market 
imperfections. Lending rates are set as a premium over 
the cost of borrowing from the central bank, with the 
premium itself depending on firms’ effective collateral. 
Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined 
and a capital channel is introduced through a signaling 
effect of capital buffers on the cost of bank deposits. 
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The macroeconomic effects of various shocks (a drop in 
output, an increase in the refinance rate, and a rise in the 
capital adequacy ratio) are analyzed, under both binding 
and nonbinding capital requirements. Factors affecting 
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behavior of the risk premium) are also identified and 
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21 Introduction
The global ﬁnancial crisis triggered by the collapse of the subprime mortgage
market in the United States has led to a reassessment of the policies and rules
that have allowed the buildup of ﬁnancial fragilities. The regulatory frame-
work, and the distortions in bank behavior and the ﬁnancial intermediation
process that it has created, have come under renewed scrutiny. Indeed, it
is now well recognized that the Basel I regulatory capital regime that U.S.
banks were subject to gave them strong incentives to reduce required capital
by shifting loans oﬀ their balance sheets.1 Banks turned to an “originate and
distribute” model, in which standardized loans, mostly high-risk mortgages–
involving no money down, interest only or less as the initial payment, with
no documentation on borrowers’ capacity to pay, and initial “teaser” interest
rates that would adjust upward even if market rates remained constant–
could be bundled and sold as securities, thereby leaving the originating bank
free to use its capital elsewhere. As the housing market deteriorated, and un-
certainty about the underlying value of subprime mortgage-backed securities
mounted, eﬀorts to maintain capital adequacy led to massive deleveraging,
capital hoarding, liquidity shortages, and contractions in credit supply, with
adverse consequences for the functioning of both real and ﬁnancial markets
(see Calomiris (2008), and Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2009)).
Since consultations on the Basel II accord started, and since its eventual
adoption in 2004, there has been a broader debate on the procyclicality ef-
fect of prudential and regulatory rules and practices.2 With Basel II, capital
1The 1988 Basel I Accord prescribed that banks hold capital of at least 8 percent
of their risk-weighted assets. Critics noted early on that it treated all corporate credits
alike and thereby invited regulatory arbitrage, and that it failed to take account of the
distortions induced by capital regulation.
2The 2004 Basel II allows banks to use their internal models to assess the riskiness of
3requirements are based on asset quality rather than only on asset type,a n d
banks must use “marking to market” to price assets, rather than book value.
As the rules make bank capital requirements more sensitive to changes in
the banks’ risk exposure, and as the riskiness of loan books changes over
the business cycle, the required regulatory capital varies with the business
cycle. For instance, when asset prices start declining, banks may be forced to
undertake continuous writedowns (accompanied by increased provisioning),
and this raises their need for capital. Capital requirements may therefore
increase in a cyclical downturn. If banks are highly leveraged, to maintain
their capital ratio during a recession, they must either raise capital (which
is diﬃcult and/or costly in bad times) or cut back their lending, which in
turn tends to amplify the downturn. Thus, the introduction of risk-sensitive
capital charges may not only unduly increase the volatility of regulatory cap-
ital, it may also (by limiting banks’ ability to lend) exacerbate an economic
downturn.
Most existing studies of the cyclicality of capital regulatory regimes, both
theoretical and empirical, are based on industrialized countries.3 However,
the pervasiveness of ﬁnancial market imperfections in developing countries,
coupled with their greater vulnerability to shocks, makes a focus on these
countries warranted. For middle-income countries, in particular, these im-
their portfolios and to determine their required capital cushion–provided that their inter-
nal model is validated by the regulatory authority. It also acknowledges the importance of
two complementary mechanisms to safeguard ﬁnancial stability, namely supervision and
market discipline.
3For empirical studies on industrial countries, see for instance Ayuso, Pérez, and Sau-
rina (2004), Bikker (2004), Gordy and Howells (2006), and Van Roy (2008). For theoretical
contributions, see Blum and Hellwig (1995), Zicchino (2005), Cecchetti and Li (2008), and
the literature surveys by Drumond (2008), and VanHoose (2008). Pereira (2009) provides
references to the limited literature on middle-income countries. He also provides a criti-
cal review of the empirical evidence, based on the general equilibrium implications of the
present paper.
4perfections cover a broad spectrum: underdeveloped capital markets, which
imply limited alternatives (such as corporate bonds and commercial paper)
to bank credit; limited competition among banks; more severe asymmetric
information problems, which make screening out good from bad credit risks
diﬃcult and fosters collateralized lending; a pervasive role of government in
banking, both directly or indirectly; uncertain public guarantees; inadequate
disclosure and transparency, coupled with weak supervision and a limited
ability to enforce prudential regulations; weak property rights and an ineﬃ-
cient legal system, which makes contract enforcement diﬃcult and also en-
courages collateralized lending; and a volatile economic environment, which
increases exposure to adverse shocks and magniﬁes (all else equal) both the
possibility of default by borrowers and the risk of bankruptcy of ﬁnancial in-
stitutions. One implication is that a large majority of small and medium-size
ﬁrms (operating mostly in the informal sector) are simply squeezed out of the
credit market, whereas those who do have access to it–well-established ﬁrms,
often belonging to members of the local elite–face an elastic supply of loans
and borrow at terms that depend on their ability to pledge collateral. Credit
rationing–which results fundamentally from the fact that inadequate collat-
eral would have led to prohibitive rates–is therefore largely “exogenous.” A
second implication is the importance of the cost channel, which becomes a
key part of the monetary transmission mechanism.4 The goal of this paper is
to analyze the cyclical eﬀects of Basel I- and Basel II-type capital standards
in a simple macroeconomic model that captures some of these ﬁnancial fea-
tures and implications. As it turns out, a key variable in the determination
of macroeconomic equilibrium is the risk premium that banks charge their
4The direct eﬀect of lending rates on ﬁrms’ marginal production costs is a common
feature of developing economies, and there is evidence that it may be important also in
industrial countries. See the references in Agénor and Alper (2009), for instance.
5customers, depending on the eﬀective collateral that they can pledge.
The paper continues as follows. Section II presents the model. Basel
I- and Basel II-type regulatory capital regimes are deﬁned, the latter by
linking the risk premium on loans to risk weights. A “bank capital channel”
is accounted for by introducing a signaling eﬀect of capital buﬀers on bank
deposit rates; this diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the literature on this topic, which
tends to focus on the ﬁnancing choices of banks in an environment where the
Modigliani-Miller theorem fails (see, for instance, Van den Heuvel (2007)).
Section III focuses on the case where capital requirements are not binding and
studies the impact of three types of shocks on macroeconomic equilibrium
and the degree of cyclicality of lending and interest rates: a negative supply
shock, an increase in the central bank’s policy rate, and an increase in the
capital adequacy ratio. Considering a range of shocks is important because a
regulatory regime may impart a procyclical bias to some variables for certain
shocks and a countercyclical bias to the same variables for other shocks. In
addition, considering a shock to the policy interest rate allows us to assess
how the regulatory regime aﬀects the transmission of monetary policy in the
c o n t e x to fam i d d l e - i n c o m ec o u n t r y – a ni s s u et h a th a sn o tr e c e i v e dm u c h
attention in the literature. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The model that we develop builds on the static framework with monopolistic
banks developed by Agénor and Montiel (2008a). Speciﬁcally, it combines
the cost channel of monetary policy with an explicit analysis of the links
between collateral, capital requirements, and bank pricing behavior. Both
features capture key aspects of credit market imperfections in middle-income
6countries, as documented earlier. Because borrowers’ ability to repay is un-
certain, lending is collateralized, and eﬀective collateral aﬀe c t st h et e r m so f
credit through a risk premium that banks incorporate in lending rates. More-
over, at the prevailing lending rate, the supply of loans is perfectly elastic.
There is therefore no endogenous credit rationing, as noted earlier. As is
now standard, we also assume that the central bank’s supply of liquidity is
perfectly elastic at a target interest rate. Monetary policy is therefore imple-
mented through a standing facility. In what follows we describe the behavior
of the four types of agents that populate the economy, ﬁrms, households, a
commercial bank, and the central bank.
2.1 Firms
Firms produce a single, homogeneous good. To ﬁnance their working capital
needs, which consist solely of labor costs, ﬁrms (which have no retained
earnings, for simplicity) must borrow from the bank. Total production costs
faced by the representative ﬁr ma r et h u se q u a lt ot h ew a g eb i l lp l u st h e
interest payments made on bank loans. For simplicity, we will assume that
loans contracted for the purpose of ﬁnancing working capital (which are
short-term in nature), are fully collateralized by the ﬁrm’s capital stock, and
are therefore made at a rate that reﬂects only the cost of borrowing from
the central bank, iR.5 Firms repay working capital loans, with interest, at
the end of the period, after goods have been produced and sold. Loans are
therefore one-period debt contracts. Proﬁts are transferred at the end of each
period to the ﬁrms’ owners, households.
Let W denote the nominal wage, N the quantity of labor employed, and
5Adding a ﬁxed proﬁt margin over and above the reﬁnance rate would not aﬀect the
results qualitatively.
7iR the oﬃcial rate charged by the central bank to the commercial bank (or
the reﬁnance rate, for short); the wage bill (inclusive of borrowing costs) is
thus (1 + iR)WN. The maximization problem faced by the representative
ﬁrm can be written as
N =a r gm a x [ PY − (1 + iR)WN], (1)
where Y denotes output and P t h ep r i c eo ft h eg o o d .





where A>0 is a shift parameter, K0 is the beginning-of-period stock of
physical capital (which is therefore predetermined), and α ∈ (0,1).




0 − (1 + iR)W =0 .
















These equations show that labor demand and supply of the good are
inversely related to the eﬀective cost of labor, (1 + iR)(W/P).
Given the short-run nature of the model, the nominal wage is assumed






6Assuming that the nominal wage is indexed to the price level would not alter qualita-
tively our results as long as indexation is less than perfect.
8with Nd
P,Ys
P > 0, Nd
iR,Ys
iR < 0,a n dNd
A,Ys
A > 0.7 An increase in borrowing
costs or a reduction in prices (which raises the real wage) exert a contrac-
tionary eﬀect on output and employment.




where iL is the nominal lending rate, πa the expected rate of inﬂation, and
h0 < 0.
Using (5) and (6), the total amount of loans demanded (and allocated by
the bank) to ﬁnance labor costs and capital accumulation, LF,i st h u s
L





Households supply labor inelastically, consume goods, and hold two imper-
fectly substitutable assets: currency (which bears no interest), in nominal
quantity BILL, and bank deposits, in nominal quantity D. Because house-
holds own the bank, they also hold equity capital, which is ﬁxed at ¯ E.8
Household wealth, FH,i st h u sd e ﬁned as:
F
H = BILL
H + D + ¯ E. (8)
The relative demand for currency is assumed to be inversely related to
7Except otherwise indicated, partial derivatives are denoted by corresponding sub-
scripts, whereas the total derivative of a function of a single argument is denoted by a
prime.
8It could be assumed, as in Cecchetti and Li (2008), that bank capital is directly and
positively related to aggregate output, because an increase in that variable raises the
value of bank assets–possibly because borrowers are now more able to repay their debts.






where iD is the interest rate on bank deposits and ν0 < 0. Using (8), this
equation can be rewritten as
D
FH − ¯ E
= hD(iD), (10)
where hD(iD)=1 /[1 + ν(iD)] and h0
D > 0.T h u s ,
BILLH
FH − ¯ E
= hB(iD), (11)
where hB = ν(iD)/[1 + ν(iD)] and h0
B < 0.
Real consumption expenditure by households, C, depends negatively on
the real deposit rate (which captures an intertemporal eﬀect) and positively
on labor income and the real value of wealth at the beginning of the period:9










where πa is the exogenous expected inﬂation rate, α1 ∈ (0,1) the marginal
propensity to consume out of disposable income, and α0 , α2, α3 > 0.T h e
positive eﬀect of current labor income on private spending is consistent with
the evidence regarding the pervasiveness of liquidity constraints in middle-
income countries (see Agénor and Montiel (2008b)) and the (implicit) as-
sumption that households cannot borrow directly from banks to smooth con-
sumption.
9Recall that proﬁts are distributed only at the end of each period. For simplicity, we
also assume that interest on deposits is paid at the end of the period; current income
consists therefore only of wages.
102.3 Commercial Bank
Assets of the commercial bank consist of total credit extended to ﬁrms, LF,
and mandatory reserves held at the central bank, RR. The bank’s liabilities
consist of the book value of equity capital, ¯ E, household deposits, and bor-
rowing from the central bank, LB. The balance sheet of the representative
commercial bank can therefore be written as:
L
F + RR = ¯ E + D + L
B, (13)
where all variables are measured in nominal terms. Reserves held at the
central bank pay no interest and are set in proportion to deposits:
RR = μD, (14)
where μ ∈ (0,1).
2.3.1 Interest Rate Pricing Rules
The bank is risk-neutral and sets both deposit and lending rates. We consider
both decisions in turn.
Deposit Rate and Capital Buﬀers Household deposits and loans from
the central bank are viewed as perfect substitutes at the margin; thus, the
(gross) interest rate on deposits must be equal to the (gross) cost of cen-
tral bank liquidity, corrected for the cost of holding reserve requirements on
deposits:
1+iD =( 1+iR)(1 − μ). (15)
This speciﬁcation is similar to the one used in Agénor and Montiel (2008).
However, we also consider a more general speciﬁcation, in which the bank’s
11capital position aﬀects its funding costs, through a “signaling” eﬀect. Specif-
ically, we assume that the bank’s capital buﬀer (as measured by the ratio of
actual to required capital) allows it to raise deposits more cheaply, because
households internalize the fact that bank capital increases its incentives to
screen and monitor its borrowers. Depositors, therefore, are willing to accept
a lower, but safer, return.10
Formally, let ER be the capital requirement (deﬁned below); the capital
buﬀer, measured as a ratio, is thus ¯ E/ER. The alternative speciﬁcation that
we consider is thus
1+iD =( 1+iR)(1 − μ)f(
¯ E
ER), (16)
where 0 <f(·) ≤ 1, f0 < 0,a n df(1) = 1. The last condition implies that if
¯ E = ER, bank capital has no eﬀect on the deposit rate, as speciﬁed in (15).11
The strength of the bank capital channel, as deﬁned here, can therefore be
measured by |f0|. However, from (12), whether the existence of this channel
(which operates through the deposit rate) matters depends on the presence
of an intertemporal substitution eﬀect on consumption.
An idea similar to ours is developed in Chen (2001), where banks, which
act as delegated monitors, must be well-capitalized to convince depositors
that they have enough at stake in funding risky projects. Our speciﬁcation
is also consistent with the view, discussed by Calomiris and Wilson (2004),
that depositors have a low preference for high-risk deposits and may demand
a “lemons premium” (or penalty interest rate) as a result of a perceived
10We could assume that the absolute magnitude of equity capital exerts also a signaling
eﬀect. However, given that we keep ¯ E constant, this modiﬁcation would not have any
substantive implication for our results.
11Note that we also assume implicitly that depositors do not observe the risk premium
set by the bank; otherwise, if they are risk averse to some degree, a positive relationship
could arise between θL and iD.
12increase in bank debt risk. To limit this risk (and therefore reduce deposit
rates), banks may respond by accumulating capital. Alternatively, the link
between the capital buﬀer and deposit rates could reﬂect the fact that well-
capitalized banks face lower expected bankruptcy costs (that is, lower ex post
monitoring costs in case of default) and hence lower funding costs ex ante
from households. Whatever the interpretation, the general point is that in
a volatile economic environment, where the risk of adverse shocks is high,
signals about a bank’s solvency can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on depositors’
behavior–particularly when government deposit guarantees (in the form of
a deposit insurance system, for instance) do not exist or are not reliable.12
L e n d i n gR a t ea n dt h eR i s kP r e m i u m The contractual lending rate,
iL, is set as a premium over the central bank reﬁnance rate, which represents
the marginal cost of funds:
1+iL =( 1+θL)(1 + iR), (17)
where θL is the risk premium. With non-binding capital requirements, we
assume that the premium is inversely related to the asset-to-liability ratio
of the borrower, given by the “eﬀective” value of collateral pledged by the
borrower (that is, assets that can be borrowed against) divided by its liabili-
ties, that is, borrowing for investment purposes, PI.I nt u r n ,t h e“ e ﬀective”






12Interestingly enough, in the empirical part of their study, Calomiris and Wilson (2004)
focus on the behavior of New York City banks during the 1920s and 1930s. They argue
that doing so is important because during that time the U.S. deposit insurance system
either did not exist or did not have much impact on the risk choices of these banks–
therefore allowing them to better assess the link between deposit default risk and bank
capital.
13where g0 < 0.T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation is consistent with the view that collateral, by
increasing borrowers’ eﬀort and reducing their incentives to take on excessive
risk, reduces moral hazard and raises the repayment probability–inducing
the bank therefore to reduce the premium on its loans for investment pur-
poses.13 Thus, an increase in goods or asset prices, or a reduction in borrow-
ing, tends to raise the ﬁrm’s eﬀective asset-to-liability ratio and to reduce the
risk premium demanded by the bank. As discussed in subsequent sections,
t h ef a c tt h a tt h ep r e m i u md e p e n d se n d o g e n o u s l yo nt h ep r i c eo ft h ed o m e s -
tic good (through its impact on output) allows monetary policy to generate
ﬁnancial accelerator or decelerator eﬀects, implying that the premium may
be either procyclical or countercyclical.
2.3.2 Capital Requirements
Capital requirements are based on the bank’s risk-weighted assets. Suppose
that the risk weight on “safe” assets (reserves and loans for working capital
needs) is 0, whereas the risk weight on investment loans is σ>0, respectively.
Risk-weighted assets are thus σPI. The capital requirement constraint can
therefore be written as
E
R = σρPI, (19)
where ρ ∈ (0,1) is the capital adequacy ratio (the so-called Cooke ratio).
If the penalty (monetary or reputational) cost of holding capital below the
required level is prohibitive, we can exclude the case where ¯ E<E R;t h e
issue is therefore whether ¯ E = ER or ¯ E>E R.
We consider two alternative regimes for the determination of the risk
weight σ. Under the ﬁrst regime, which corresponds to Basel I, the risk
13Note also that (18) is based on ﬂows, rather than stocks, as in Agénor and Montiel
(2008). There is therefore no “balance sheet” or “net worth” eﬀect on the premium, as
in the Bernanke-Gertler tradition, but rather a (ﬂow) collateral eﬀect.
14weight is exogenous at σR; the bank keeps a ﬂat minimum percentage of cap-
ital against loans provided for the purpose of investment. Under the second,
which corresponds to Basel II, capital requirements are risk-based; the risk
weight is endogenous and inversely related to loan quality, which in turn is
inversely related to the risk premium imposed by the bank, θL. This is similar
in spirit to linking the risk weight to the probability of default of borrowers,
as proposed by Heid (2007). Thus, as allowed under Basel II, we assume that
the bank uses an IRB approach, or its own default risk assessment, in calcu-
lating the appropriate risk weight–and by implication required regulatory
capital. This assumes in turn that the standards embedded in the bank’s risk
management system have been validated by the regulator–the central bank
here–through an Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP).





σR ≤ 1 under Basel I
σ(θL),σ 0 > 0 under Basel II
. (20)
Inspection of equations (5), (7), (17), (18), (19), and (20) yields the
following result:
Proposition 1. In partial equilibrium, a negative supply shock (a fall
in A)l o w e r se ﬀective collateral and raises the risk premium on investment
loans; under Basel II, the risk weight associated with these loans and capital
requirements also increase and bank lending for investment must fall if the
capital constraint is binding ( ¯ E = ER).
The link between σ and θL under Basel II is consistent with speciﬁcations
that relate risk weights to the borrower’s probability of default over the
business cycle, as for instance in Tanaka (2002) and Heid (2007). Proposition
1 captures one of the general concerns about Basel II: during a recession for
14Under Basel II, it is technically possible for σ to exceed unity.
15instance (say, a negative supply shock, as discussed here), if lending to ﬁrms
is considered riskier because collateral values fall, the bank will be required
to hold more capital–or, failing that, to reduce lending (indirectly in the
present case, by increasing the risk premium). In turn, the credit crunch will
exacerbate the economic downturn, making capital requirements procyclical.
However, in the present setting there are also a number of other (endoge-
nous) factors that will aﬀect the premium. The fall in lending that may
result from a binding capital constraint following an increase in risk tends
not only to reduce output but also the collateral required by the bank; this
dampens the initial increase in the premium. In addition, changes in lend-
ing and aggregate supply will aﬀect prices, which will aﬀect the equilibrium
value of the premium as well. With the bank capital channel embedded in
the model, changes in the capital buﬀer will also aﬀect the deposit rate and
consumption, which in turn will aﬀect aggregate demand and prices. These
interactions imply that the net eﬀect of shocks can be fully assessed only
through a general equilibrium analysis.
2.3.3 Borrowing from the Central Bank
Given that ﬁrms’ demand for credit determines the actual supply of loans,
and that the required reserve ratio is set by the monetary authority, the
balance sheet condition (13) can be solved residually for borrowing from
the central bank, LB. Because there is no reason for the bank to borrow
if it can fund its loan operations with deposits, and using (14), we have
LB =m a x [ 0 ,L F − (1 − μ)D − ¯ E].15
15Note that in the present setting the bank’s proﬁts are not necessarily zero. Just like
ﬁrms’ proﬁts, we assume that this income is distributed to households only at the end of
the period.
162.4 Central Bank
The balance sheet of the central bank consists, on the asset side, of loans
to the commercial bank, LB. On the liability side, it consists only of the
monetary base, MB:
L
B = MB, (21)
with the monetary base given also by the sum of total currency in circulation,
BILL, and reserves:
MB = BILL+ RR. (22)
Monetary policy is operated by setting the reﬁn a n c er a t ea tt h ec o n s t a n t
rate iR and providing liquidity (at the discretion of the commercial bank)
through a standing facility.
Because central bank liquidity is endogenous, the monetary base is also
endogenous; this implies, using (14) and (21), that the supply of currency is
BILL
s = L
B − μD. (23)
2.5 Market-Clearing Conditions
There are ﬁve market equilibrium conditions to consider: four ﬁnancial (de-
posits, loans, central bank credit, and cash), and one for the goods market.
Markets for deposits and loans adjust through quantities, with the bank set-
ting prices in both cases. The supply of central bank credit is perfectly elas-
t i ca tt h eo ﬃcial reﬁnance rate iR and the market also equilibrates through
quantity adjustment.
The equilibrium condition of the goods market, which determines the
goods price P,i sg i v e nb y :
Y
s = C + I. (24)
17The last equilibrium condition relates to the market for cash, and (under
the assumption that the counterpart to bank loans is held by ﬁrms in the
form of currency) involves (11) and (23). However, there is no need to write
this condition explicitly, given that by Walras’ Law it can be eliminated.
3 Non-Binding Capital Requirements
We ﬁrst consider the case where existing equity capital is higher than the
required value, that is, ¯ E>E R, regardless of whether σ is endogenous or
not. This is consistent with the evidence suggesting that, in normal times,
banks often hold more capital than the regulatory minimum–possibly as
a result of market discipline (see Rochet (2008)). However, although bank
capital is not a binding constraint on the bank’s behavior, it still plays an
indirect role, by aﬀecting how the bank sets the deposit rate.16
The solution of the model is described in the Appendix. As shown there,
the model can be condensed into two equilibrium conditions in terms of
the risk premium, θL, and the price of the domestic good, P.T h e ﬁrst is
the ﬁnancial equilibrium condition, deﬁn e db y( 1 8 ) .T h es e c o n di st h eg o o d s
market equilibrium condition (24), after substitution from (5), (6), (12), (16),
(17), and (20).
A graphical presentation of the equilibrium is shown in Figure 1. In the
northeast quadrant of the ﬁgure, the ﬁnancial equilibrium curve is labeled
FF. As shown in the Appendix, FF does not depend on the regulatory
regime; it slope is given by
dθL
dP











16Equivalently, the condition ¯ E>E R sets an upper bound on investment, PI < ¯ E/σρ.
We will assume that this restriction is not binding.
18where NB stands for “nonbinding” and Σ > 0 is deﬁn e di nt h eA p p e n d i x .
Intuitively, a rise in prices stimulates output and increases the eﬀective value
of ﬁrms’ collateral relative to the initial demand for loans; the risk premium
must therefore fall, at the initial level of investment.
T h eg o o d sm a r k e te q u i l i b r i u mc o n d i t i o ny i e l d st h ec u r v e sl a b e l e dG1G1
(which corresponds to the Basel I regime) and G2G2 (corresponding to the
Basel II regime). The slopes of these curves are given by, respectively
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where ∆2 < 0 and |∆2| > |∆1|. Thus, a comparison of (25) and (26) implies
that G2G2 is ﬂatter than G1G1. Inspection of these results also shows that
curves G1G1 and G2G2 have a steeper slope than in the absence of a bank
capital channel (f0 =0 ), given by
dθL
dP




















w h i c hi st h es l o p eo fc u r v eGG in Figure 1.
Intuitively, the negative slope of the GG curves can be explained as fol-
lows. A rise in prices tends to lower aggregate demand through a negative
wealth eﬀect on consumption. At the same time, it increases the nominal
value of loans and thus capital requirements; the fall in the capital buﬀer
raises the deposit rate, which (through intertemporal substitution) lowers
current consumption. However, the increase in P also boosts aggregate sup-
ply, by reducing the real (eﬀective) wage, and may stimulate consumption,
19as a result of higher labor demand and distributed wage income.17 Because
the shift in supply outweighs the wage income eﬀect, and because the wealth
and capital buﬀer eﬀects are unambiguously negative, an increase in prices
creates excess supply. The risk premium must therefore fall to stimulate in-
vestment and restore equilibrium in the goods market. This implies that the
GG curves have a negative slope, as shown in the ﬁgure.
Curves G1G1 and G2G2 are steeper than curve GG (which corresponds to
f0 =0 ) because the bank capital channel adds additional downward pressure
on consumption–requiring therefore a larger fall in the premium to generate
an oﬀsetting expansion in investment.
By implication, the intuitive reason why G2G2 is ﬂatter than G1G1 is
because under Basel II there is an additional eﬀect–the fall in the risk pre-
mium alluded to earlier lowers the risk weight. This mitigates therefore the
initial drop in the capital buﬀer (at the initial level of investment) induced
by the rise in prices. In turn, this dampens the increase in the deposit rate
and the drop in consumption. Given that aggregate supply and wage income
increases in the same proportion in both regimes, the risk premium must fall
by less under Basel II to stimulate investment and reestablish equilibrium
between supply and demand.
Under standard dynamic assumptions, local stability requires the GG
curves to be steeper than FF.18 The positive relationship between the risk
premium and the lending rate is shown in the northwest quadrant, whereas
the negative relationship between the lending rate and investment is dis-
17The net eﬀect of distributed wage income on consumption depends on the sign of
PNd
P − Nd. Thus, a positive eﬀect requires that PNd
P/N d > 1,o re q u i v a l e n t l yt h a tt h e
elasticity of labor demand with respect to prices be suﬃciently high.
18Local stability can be analyzed by postulating an adjustment mechanism that relates
changes in P to excess demand for goods, and changes in the risk premium to the diﬀerence
between the its equilibrium and current values; see Agénor and Montiel (2008a).
20played in the northwest quadrant. The supply of goods, which is an in-
creasing function of the price level, is shown in the southeast quadrant. The
diﬀerence between supply and investment in the southwest quadrant gives
private spending, C. The economy’s equilibrium is determined at points E,
D, H,a n dJ.19
We now turn to an analysis of the adjustment process to a supply shock,
a change in the reﬁnance rate, and a change in the capital adequacy ratio.
3.1 Negative Supply Shock
Consider ﬁrst a negative shock to output, that is, a drop in A.20 The results
are illustrated in Figure 2; because the diﬀerence between the two regulatory
regimes is only in terms of the slope of curve GG, we consider only the Basel
I regime, to avoid cluttering the graph unnecessarily. Diﬀerences between the
t w or e g i m e sa r ep o i n t e do u tl a t e r . W ea l s of o c u sa tﬁrst on the movement
that leads to point E0.
The ﬁrst eﬀect of the shock is of course a drop in output; as shown in
the southeast quadrant, the supply curve shifts inward, with output (at the
initial level of prices) dropping from H to M. The drop in output lowers
the value of collateral at the initial level of investment; the premium must
therefore increase to account for the fact that lending has now become more
risky. Curve FF therefore shifts upward, and θL rises ﬁrst from E to B.T h e
fall in output also leads to excess demand on the goods market; at initial
prices, the risk premium must therefore increase to restore equilibrium (by
19Of course, GG, G1G1,a n dG2G2 would not normally intersect FF at the same point
E. This is shown only for convenience.
20Instead of a supply shock, we could also consider a negative demand shock, as measured
by a fall in α0 in (12). Although the transmission mechanism is diﬀerent, the conclusion
about the procyclicality of Basel I and Basel II in this case are qualitatively similar to
those discussed below. We therefore do not report them to save space.
21lowering investment). Curve G1G1 therefore shifts also upward.
There is, however, “overshooting” in the behavior of the premium; the
initial increase in not suﬃcient to eliminate excess demand through a drop
in investment only–to do so would require an increase from E to B00,w h i c h
is not feasible. Accordingly, prices must increase, which tend (through a
negative wealth eﬀect) to lower consumption as well. Because the increase
in prices also lowers real wages, the initial drop in output is dampened; after
falling from H to M, output recovers gradually from M to H0. The associated
increase in the value of collateral allows the premium to fall, from B to the
new equilibrium point, E0. In the new equilibrium, the lending rate is higher,
investment lower, and so is consumption.
However, it is also possible for the new equilibrium to be characterized
by a lower premium and higher prices; this is illustrated by the curves in-
tersecting at point E000 in Figure 2. This corresponds to a case where curve
FF shifts only slightly (which occurs if the risk premium does not adjust
rapidly to changes in the collateral-loan ratio, that is, g0 is small) and G1G1
shifts by a large amount (which occurs if investment is not very sensitive to
the lending rate).21 F o l l o w i n ga nu p w a r dj u m p( f r o mE to B0), the premium
undergoes a prolonged “decelerator” eﬀect, eventually with a smaller adverse
eﬀect on investment, but at the cost of higher prices.22
How does the “capital channel” operate in this setting? Because invest-
ment falls, capital requirements also fall. This implies that the bank’s capital
21If the premium does not adjust at all following a drop in A–so that FF remains at
its initial position–the new equilibrium point would be at E00. The case where FF does
not change would occur if, for instance, eﬀective collateral was measured, as in Agénor
and Montiel (2008a), in terms of the value of the beginning-of-period capital stock, PK 0.
22Although not represented in Figure 2, it is also possible for the equilibrium outcome
to entail a rise in the premium and a fall in prices (that is, an equilibrium point located
to the northwest of E). This would ocur if FF shifts by a large amount and G1G1 shifts
only a little.
22buﬀer increases. Through the signaling eﬀect discussed earlier (f0 < 0), the
deposit rate falls; this, in turn, tends to increase consumption today, through
intertemporal substitution. This result can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2. With non-binding capital requirements, the bank capital
channel induces an expansion of consumption in response to a negative supply
shock.
Put diﬀerently, although bank capital has no direct eﬀect on loans, it does
have indirect eﬀects, to the extent that it aﬀects deposit rates, aggregate
demand, and thus prices–which in turn aﬀect output, collateral, and the
risk premium. This transmission channel is similar under both regulatory
regimes–except that with Basel II the eﬀect on price are magniﬁed and the
eﬀect on the risk premium is mitigated.
More formally, consider the following deﬁnition:23
Deﬁnition. Av a r i a b l ex is procyclical (countercyclical) with respect to
an exogenous shock z if its movement in response to z,a sm e a s u r e db yt h e
ﬁrst derivative dx/dz, is such as to amplify (mitigate) the movement in equi-
librium output in response to that shock, dY/dz.
In the present setting, we can focus on the risk premium, given that the
supply of loans is perfectly elastic, and that the demand for credit for the
purpose of ﬁnancing working capital needs is (by deﬁnition) procyclical.24
Here, we have dθL/dA ≶ 0, which implies that the risk premium can be
either procyclical with respect to A–falling during booms and rising during
downswings, thereby exacerbating the initial movement in output, as per
the deﬁnition above–or countercyclical (dθL/dA > 0).This ambiguity exists
23Borio and Zhu (2008) for instance use a deﬁnition that is essentially similar. Note
that, in the literature, procyclicality is often deﬁned in terms of required capital only.
24Note that the cyclicality of the nominal value of loans for investment purposes, PI,
depends on the behavior of prices as well. Our focus on the risk premium is equivalent
to focusing on real lending for investment, given that these two variables always vary in
opposite directions.
23regardless of the regulatory regime, because it holds even in the absence of a
bank capital channel (f0 =0or α2 =0 )–given that in this case neither FF,
nor GG,d e p e n d so nσ.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r ef0 > 0 (and α2 > 0), the impact of the regulatory
regime on the degree of procyclicality of the risk premium can be formally
assessed by calculating the derivative of the equilibrium outcome dθL/dA
with respect to σ,t h a ti s ,d2θL/dAdσ, in a manner similar to Heid (2007).
More intuitively, this outcome can be gauged by examining how σ aﬀects the
slopes of FF and GG.A s n o t e d e a r l i e r , FF does not depend on σ; G2G2
is ﬂatter than G1G1;a n db o t hG1G1 and G2G2 have a steeper slope with
f0 > 0 than with f0 =0 . This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. With non-binding capital requirements, and a bank capi-
tal channel, both regulatory regimes magnify the procyclical eﬀe c to fan e g a t i v e
supply shock on the risk premium; all else equal, Basel II is less procyclical
than Basel I.
Intuitively, the reason why the regulatory capital regime magniﬁes an up-
ward movement in the risk premium compared to the case where the regime
does not matter (f0 =0 ) is because the improvement in the capital buﬀer
tends (as noted in Proposition 2) to stimulate private consumption; conse-
quently, at the initial level of prices, “bringing down” aggregate demand to
the lower level of output requires a larger drop in investment–and therefore
a larger increase in the premium. This movement is also more signiﬁcant in
the Basel I regime, because in the case of Basel II the initial increase in the
premium raises the risk weight–which in turn limits the downward eﬀect on
capital requirements resulting from the fall in the level of investment (that is,
ER falls by less than the drop in I because σ rises); as a result, the increase
in the capital buﬀer is less signiﬁcant, the deposit rate falls by less, and the
stimulus to consumption is mitigated. The rise in the risk premium required
24t or e s t o r ee q u i l i b r i u mt ot h eg o o d sm a r k e ti st h u so fal o w e rm a g n i t u d e .
3.2 Increase in Oﬃcial Reﬁnance Rate
The macroeconomic eﬀects of an increase in the reﬁnance rate are illustrated
in Figure 3. The immediate eﬀect of an increase in iR is twofold. First, it
raises production costs and lowers output, which drops from point H to M
in the southeast quadrant, following an inward shift in the supply curve. The
resulting drop in eﬀective collateral tends to put upward pressure on the risk
premium. Second, there is a direct eﬀect on the lending rate; because an
increase in the reﬁnance rate raises the cost of marginal funds, it is “passed
on” directly to borrowers. In the northeast quadrant, the curve linking θL
and iL shifts outward. The increase in the lending rate lowers investment,
which in turn tends to lower the risk premium by reducing the volume of bank
loans. The net impact eﬀect on the premium is thus ambiguous. We assume
in what follows that the net eﬀect of an increase in iR is to raise the premium.
As formally established in the Appendix, this requires that the elasticity of
output with respect to the reﬁn a n c er a t eb eh i g h e r( i na b s o l u t et e r m s )t h a n
the elasticity of investment with respect to that rate. The “collateral” eﬀect
therefore dominates the “loan demand” eﬀect.25 If so, then, curve FF shifts
upward and the premium jumps from point E to point B.
On the goods market, there are several eﬀects at play at the initial level
of prices. As noted earlier, both aggregate supply and investment fall. In
addition, consumption changes as well, as a result of two eﬀects. On the
one hand, the reﬁnance rate raises directly the deposit rate, thereby lowering
consumption as a result of the standard intertemporal eﬀect. On the other,
25This is quite appropriate for middle-income countries where bank loans are essential
for short-term economic activity.
25the fall in investment reduces capital requirements, thereby increasing the
capital buﬀer, which in turn tends to lower the deposit rate and stimulate
consumption. The net eﬀect on consumption is thus ambiguous in general.
We assume in what follows that the net eﬀect on aggregate demand is neg-
ative; a suﬃcient (although not necessary) condition for that to occur is for
the direct cost eﬀect of iR on iD to dominate the indirect capital buﬀer eﬀect.
Because aggregate supply and aggregate demand both fall, prices may either
increase or fall to restore equilibrium in the goods market. Graphically, curve
G1G1 may shift either left or right. If excess demand (supply) prevails at the
initial level of prices, the price level must increase (fall) and G1G1 shifts to
the left (right).
Thus, following its initial jump from E to B, the risk premium can ei-
ther continue increasing, from B to E0,o rf a l lf r o mB to E00.I n t h e ﬁrst
case, there is a ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect; the drop in prices stimulates con-
sumption (through the wealth eﬀect), raises real wages and lowers output
(which falls from M to H0), and the fall in collateral tends to increase the
premium–despite the drop in the demand for loans. In the second case,
the increase in prices tends to stimulate output and to raise the eﬀective
value of collateral while reducing consumption; there is therefore a ﬁnancial
“decelerator” eﬀect.26
Again, what is the role of the regulatory capital regime? The capital
buﬀer eﬀect mitigates the drop in consumption (as before) and reinforces the
possibility that aggregate demand falls by less than supply–and therefore
increases the likelihood of a drop in prices and the occurrence of a ﬁnancial
26Note also that even if G2G2 does not shift– which is the case if α2 =0 –there would
still be a ﬁnancial accelerator eﬀect (this time from B to C, the new equilibrium), but
the ﬁnancial decelerator eﬀect cannot emerge. The reason is that excess demand cannot
occur in that case.
26accelerator eﬀect. Thus, even if capital requirements are not binding, they do
aﬀect the transmission process of monetary policy. Indeed, the bank capital
channel, as modeled here, may enhance the eﬀectiveness of a contractionary
monetary policy–in contrast to some of the predictions in the literature (see,
for instance, Tanaka (2002)). Moreover, under the Basel II regime, the eﬀects
described above operate in similar fashion. But because G2G2 is less steep
than G1G1,p r i c ee ﬀects are magniﬁed, whereas changes in the premium are
mitigated. Moreover, from Proposition 2, both of these curves are steeper
than curve GG with f0 =0 . We therefore have the following result:
Proposition 4. With non-binding capital requirements, and under ei-
ther regulatory regime, the bank capital channel magniﬁe st h ei m p a c to fa n
increase in the central bank reﬁnance rate on the risk premium and mitigates
its impact on prices, compared to the case where it does not exist. In addition,
the Basel II regime imparts less procyclicality to the risk premium compared
to the Basel I regime.
3.3 Increase in Capital Adequacy Ratio
The eﬀects of an increase in the capital adequacy ratio are illustrated in
Figure 4. Curve FF does not change, given that the ﬁnancial equilibrium
condition does not depend directly on that ratio. the increase in ρ increases
capital requirements and lowers the capital buﬀer. The cost of deposits
therefore increases, which tends to lower consumption as households engage
in intertemporal substitution. At the initial level of the risk premium, prices
must fall to stimulate consumption (through the wealth eﬀect) and eliminate
the excess supply of goods. Curve GG therefore shifts downward (or to the
left), and prices fall from E to B. In turn, the fall in prices raises the real
wage and leads to a contraction in output, from H to M. Because the fall in
output lowers the value of collateral, the risk premium starts rising, from E
27to E0, while output continues to drop, from M to H0. During the transition
period, prices decline continuously. The new equilibrium point is located
at E0, characterized by a higher lending rate, lowers prices, a lower level of
investment, and lower output.
Thus, tighter capital regulation reduces bank leverage while at the same
t i m ei n c r e a s i n gt h ec o s to f( m a r k e t )f u n d i n gf o rt h eb a n ka n dt h ec o s to f
borrowing for ﬁr m s .T h ef a c tt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h ec a p i t a la d e q u a c yr a t i o
leads to a higher equilibrium loan rate and reduced lending is consistent
with the prediction of various other models based on very diﬀerent premises
(see VanHoose (2007)). Of course, if the bank capital channel is not present
(f0 =0 ), curve GG would not shift and a change in ρ would have no eﬀect
on output and prices as long as ¯ E>σ ρ L F.27
4 Binding Capital Requirements
We now consider the case where the capital requirement constraint (19) is
continuously binding, that is, ¯ E = σρLF. Because equity is predetermined,
bank lending must adjust to satisfy the capital requirement:
L
F = PI = ¯ E/σρ, (27)
regardless of whether σ is endogenous or not.28 We assume that constraint
(27) is continuously binding, due possibly to heavy penalties or reputational
costs associated with default on regulatory requirements, as noted earlier.
With (27) determining investment, equation (6) is now solved for the
27Of course, this also depends on the assumption α2 > 0.
28If σR =1 , the capital adequacy requirement is a leverage ratio, which restricts on-
balance-sheet assets to a simple multiple of available capital (LF = ¯ E/ρ). Note also that








where πa =0for simplicity. The interest rate-setting condition (17) is now











) − 1. (29)
Collateral therefore plays no longer a direct role in determining the risk
premium; equation (18) serves now to determine the eﬀective collateral re-
quired, that is, coeﬃcient κ. Of course, for the solution to be feasible requires
κ<1, which we assume is always satisﬁed. Thus, we continue to assume
that credit rationing does not emerge.
With a binding capital requirement, the capital buﬀer is unity, and be-
cause f(1) = 1, the deposit rate-setting condition is (15). Thus, the bank
capital channel, as identiﬁed in the previous section, does not operate. How-
ever, the adjustment process to shocks continues to depend in important
ways on the regulatory regime; for clarity, we consider them separately.
4.1 Constant Risk Weights
Macroeconomic equilibrium Under the Basel I regime is now illustrated in
F i g u r e5 .A sb e f o r e ,t h es o u t h e a s tq u a d r a n ts h o w st h ep o s i t i v er e l a t i o n s h i p
between output and prices. From (27), and with σ constant at σR, investment
and prices are inversely related, as shown in the southwest quadrant. Equa-
tions (28) and (29) also imply a negative relationship between investment
and the risk premium, as displayed in the northwest quadrant. Because both
the risk weight and investment and independent of the risk premium, the
goods market equilibrium condition, shown as curve G3G3 in the northeast
29quadrant, is vertical. The ﬁnancial equilibrium condition, shown as curve
F3F3, has now a positive slope, given by (see the Appendix):
dθL
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) > 0, (30)
where B stands for “binding.”
Intuitively, the reason why FF is positively sloped is because higher prices
now reduce real investment (as implied by (27)), which in turn can only occur
if the premium increases. The equilibrium obtains at points E, H, J,a n dD.




I ]/∂σR > 0.
A l le l s ee q u a l ,t h eh i g h e rσR is, the larger the eﬀect of any shock that leads
t oas h i f ti nt h eﬁnancial equilibrium condition on the risk premium, and the
smaller the eﬀect on prices.
Figures 6, 7, and 8 illustrate the macroeconomic eﬀects of the same three
shocks analyzed earlier. A negative supply shock leads to an inward shift of
the supply curve (as before), but this has no direct eﬀect on the premium at
the initial level of prices, in contrast to the case of nonbinding requirements.
Thus, F3F3 does not shift. Excess demand ofg o o d sr e q u i r e sa ni n c r e a s e
in prices to clear the market and G3G3 shifts to the right. The increase
in prices lowers investment, and this must be accompanied by an increase
in the risk premium. The price hike also lowers consumption, through a
negative wealth eﬀect. Thus, the adjustment to a negative supply shock
entails both an increase in prices and a reduction in aggregate demand. The
new equilibrium position is at points E0, H0, J0,a n dD0. The risk premium
is thus unambiguously procyclical (dθL/dA < 0).
To analyze the role of the capital regime in the transmission process of
this shock, recall that with a binding requirement the deposit rate-setting
condition (16) becomes independent of the capital buﬀer. However, as can
30be inferred from (27), the higher the risk weight (and the capital adequacy
ratio), the larger the drop in investment and lending; the smaller therefore
the adjustment in prices required to equilibrate supply and demand. Thus,
the “capital channel” operates now through investment, rather than con-
sumption. At the same time, however, a larger drop in investment must be
accompanied by a larger increase in the risk premium. Formally, it can be
shown that the general equilibrium eﬀect is |d2θL/dAdσR| > 0.
The eﬀects of an increase in the reﬁnance rate are illustrated in Figure
7. For the reasons discussed in the previous section, the goods market equi-
librium condition can move either left or right, depending on whether excess
demand or supply prevails at the initial level of prices. However, for P given,
the increase in the reﬁn a n c er a t em u s tn o wb ea c c o m p a n i e db yafall in the
risk premium, in contrast to the nonbinding case, to keep investment at its
initial level. The curve linking I and θL in the northwest quadrant shifts
inward, and the premium drops from E to B (or equivalently from D to
L). If excess demand prevails initially, prices must increase to restore equi-
librium, and curve G3G3 must shift to the right; after its initial drop, the
risk premium begins to rise, to validate the drop in investment. By contrast,
if there is excess supply initially, prices must fall, thereby increasing invest-
ment and consumption (the latter through the wealth eﬀect) and curtailing
aggregate supply. The risk premium adjusts gradually downward from B to
E00 to validate the increase in investment. As can be inferred from (27), if
prices fall, and given that σ is constant at σR, investment always increases
in equilibrium (from J to J00). The larger σR is, the smaller this increase (or
the larger the fall, if prices rise). The regulatory regime therefore magniﬁes
changes in the risk premium (|d2θL/diRdσR| > 0).
Figure 8 shows the impact of an increase in the capital adequacy ratio.
31The immediate eﬀect, as can be inferred from (27), is a reduction in invest-
ment at the initial level of prices; the curve in the southwest quadrant shifts
inward. Investment drops from J to L, and this must be accompanied by an
upward jump in the premium, from E to point B, located on the new F3F3
curve positioned to the left of the original curve. Because of the incipient
excess supply, prices must fall; thus, curve G3G3 also shifts to the left. The
drop in prices mitigates the initial drop in investment, which recovers from
L to J0. Although output (and thus collateral) falls during the transition,
the gradual increase in investment must be associated with a drop in the risk
premium, from B to E0.A tE0, the risk premium is higher than in the initial
equilibrium; however, if the shift in F3F3 is not large, the end result may be
a fall in the risk premium (point E00). In either case, prices always fall, as
in the nonbinding case (Figure 4). Again, regardless of the direction of the
eﬀect, the larger σR is, the larger the equilibrium change in the risk premium
(|d2θL/dρdσR| > 0).
The results of these experiments can be summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 5. With binding capital requirements, and under Basel I,
a negative supply shock is unambiguously procyclical, whereas an increase in
the reﬁn a n c er a t eo rt h ec a p i t a la d e q u a c yr a t i om a yb ee i t h e rp r o c y c l i c a lo r
countercyclical. The higher the risk weight σR is, the stronger the eﬀect of
all these shocks on the risk premium.
4.2 Endogenous Risk Weights
Under the Basel II regime, the endogeneity of σ precludes the use of a four-
quadrant diagram to illustrate the determination of equilibrium; it is now
s h o w ni nas i n g l eq u a d r a n t ,i nF i g u r e9 .T h ed e t e r m i n a t i o no ft h eﬁnancial
equilibrium condition F4F4 follows the same logic as before; it therefore has
32a positive slope, given now by (see the Appendix):
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) > 0, (31)
where Σ4 > 0 if σ0 is not too large, and |Σ4| < 1. A comparison of (30)
and (31) shows that this slope is steeper t h a nu n d e rB a s e lI .I n t u i t i v e l y ,t h e
reason is that now the direct, positive eﬀect of an increase in prices on the
premium (which validates the fall in real investment, as noted earlier), is
compounded by an increase in the risk weight. Thus, all else equal, shocks
would now tend to have larger eﬀects on the risk premium, and more muted
eﬀects on prices, than under the previous regime.
The goods market equilibrium condition, however, is no longer vertical;
because σ depends on θL, it can be displayed as a negative relationship


























where ∆4 < 0.
The reason why GG is downward-sloping is now diﬀerent from the non-
binding case: here an increase in the price level lowers real investment, as
implied by the binding constraint (27); this must be validated by an increase
in the risk premium. However, the price increase also lowers consumption
and stimulates output (for reasons outlined earlier); in turn, this requires
a fall in the risk premium to stimulate investment and restore equilibrium
between supply and demand. The ﬁgure assumes that the second eﬀect dom-
inates the ﬁrst (or equivalently that σ0 is not too large), so G4G4 has indeed
a negative slope. Thus, the goods market equilibrium condition is now less
steep; all else equal, shocks would tend to have more muted eﬀects on the
33risk premium, and larger eﬀects on prices, than under Basel I. Because the
slopes of the two curves are aﬀected in opposite direction by a switch from
Basel I to Basel II, it cannot be ascertained ap r i o r iwhether shocks would
tend to have larger eﬀects on the risk premium, as under the nonbinding
case–where only GG was aﬀected by a switch in regime.
Figure 10 illustrates the impact of a negative supply shock; curve G4G4
shifts to the right and the equilibrium is characterized by a higher risk pre-
mium and higher prices, as in Figure 6. Thus, the shock is procyclical, as
under Basel I. But even though only the GG c u r v es h i f t s( a si st h ec a s eu n -
der Basel I), the initial position of FF matters for the ﬁnal outcome. Thus,
whether Basel II is more procyclical or less procyclical than Basel I cannot
be determined unambiguously.
The impact of an increase in the reﬁnance rate is illustrated in Figure 11.
Because G4G4 c a nm o v ee i t h e rl e f to rr i g h t ,ar a n g eo fo u t c o m e si sp o s s i b l e –
just like under the nonbinding case (Figure 3) and the Basel I regime under
the binding case (Figure 7). Whether a change in the risk premium is pro-
cyclical or not cannot therefore be ascertained a priori. Finally, Figure 12
shows the eﬀects of an increase in the capital adequacy ratio. Both G4G4 and
F4F4 shift to the left. Although prices fall unambiguously, as before, the risk
premium can either fall (point E0)o ri n c r e a s e( p o i n tE00), depending on the
magnitude of the shift in F4F4, as with Basel I (see Figure 8). Thus, whether
the increase in the capital adequacy ratio is procyclical or countercyclical is
again ambiguous.
The following proposition summarizes the results of these experiments:
Proposition 6. With binding capital requirements, and under Basel II,
a negative supply shock is unambiguously procyclical; an increase in the re-
ﬁn a n c er a t eo rt h ec a p i t a la d e q u a c yr a t i om a yb ee i t h e rp r o c y c l i c a lo rc o u n -
tercyclical. Whether these shocks entail more procyclicality (with respect to
34Basel I) in the risk premium cannot be ascertained a priori.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze the procyclical eﬀects of Basel
I- and Basel II-type capital standards in a simple model that captures some
of the most salient credit market imperfections that characterize middle-
income countries. In our model, capital requirements are essentially aimed
at inﬂuencing bank decision-making regarding exposure to loan default. They
aﬀect both the quantity of bank lending and the pricing of bank deposits. The
bank cannot raise additional equity capital–a quite reasonable assumption
for a short-term horizon. The deposit rate is sensitive to the size of the
buﬀer, through a signaling eﬀect. Well-capitalized banks face lower expected
bankruptcy costs and hence lower funding costs from the public. We also
establish a link between regulatory risk weights and the bank’s risk premium
under Basel II; this is consistent with the fact that in that regime the amount
of capital that the bank must hold is determined not only by the institutional
nature of its borrowers (as in Basel I), but also by the riskiness of each
particular borrower. Thus, capital adequacy requirements aﬀect not only
the levels of bank lending rates, and thus investment and output; they also
aﬀect the sensitivity of bank rates (through the risk premium) to changes in
output and prices.
Our analysis showed that diﬀerent types of bank capital regulations af-
fect in diﬀerent ways the transmission process of exogenous shocks to bank
interest rates, prices, and economic activity. As discussed in the existing
literature, and regardless of the regulatory regime, capital requirements can
have sizable real eﬀects if they are binding, because in order to satisfy them
35banks may need to curtail lending through hikes in interest rates. However,
we also showed that, even if capital requirements are not binding, a “bank
capital channel” may operate through a signaling eﬀect of capital buﬀers on
deposit rates. If there is some degree of intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption, this channel may generate signiﬁcant eﬀects on the real economy.
Several policy lessons can be drawn from our analysis. First, regulators
should pay careful attention to the impact of risk weights on bank portfolio
behavior when they implement regulations. Second, capital buﬀers may not
actually mitigate the cyclical eﬀects of bank regulation; in our model, capital
buﬀers, by lowering deposit rates, are actually expansionary. Thus, if cap-
ital buﬀers are increased during an expansion, with the initial objective of
being countercyclycal, they may actually turn out to be procyclical.T h i si s
an important conclusion, given the prevailing view that counter-cyclical reg-
ulatory requirements may be a way to reduce the buildup of systemic risks:
if the signaling eﬀects of capital buﬀers are important, “leaning against the
wind” may not reduce the amplitude of the ﬁnancial-business cycle.29 A
more detailed study of the empirical importance of these signaling eﬀects is
thus a pressing task for middle-income countries. Moreover, the possibility of
asymmetric eﬀects should also be explored; for instance, a high capital buﬀer
in good times may lead households (as owners of banks) to put pressure on
these banks to generate more proﬁts, in order to guarantee a “minimum”
return on equity; by contrast, the signaling eﬀect alluded to earlier may be
strengthened in bad times.
Our analysis can be extended in several directions. One of them could be
29There are also other problems associated with “forward-looking provisioning” or
“buﬀer stock approach,” as advocated by some–including the issue of coordination and
roles of prudential policies and accounting rules, and the fact that if countercyclical con-
straints were to be applied to banks, regulatory arbitrage may encourage market funding
to step in, thereby inducing risks to migrate elsewhere in the ﬁnancial system.
36to extend the bank capital channel as modeled here by assuming that a large
capital buﬀer induces banks not only to reduce deposit rates as discussed
earlier but also to engage in more risky behavior, which may lead them to
relax lending standards and lower the cost of borrowing, in order to stimulate
the demand for loans and increase proﬁts. However, because this would lead
to an expansionary eﬀect on investment, it would go in the same direction
as the consumption eﬀect alluded to earlier. Thus, our results would not be
aﬀected qualitatively.
A second direction would be to examine the links between capital re-
quirements and risk taking. If capital requirements reduce incentives for risk
taking by banks (as in Rochet (1992) and Repullo and Suarez (2008)), we
should have more collateralized lending; this could lead in the present model
to a positive link between the reserve adequacy ratio, ρ, and the collateral
parameter, κ. However, at the same time this could increase volatility in the
risk premium, and thus the amplitude of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
A third direction would be to embed the ﬁnancial features of the present
model in a dynamic optimizing framework, as for instance in Markovic (2006),
Meh and Moran (2008), and Aguiar and Drumond (2007). This would allow
one to account for the fact that, in practice, banks can and do issue stocks,
hybrid debt capital instruments, and subordinated term debt instruments.30
These will certainly alleviate the impact of the regulation on bank asset and
liability management. In a dynamic perspective, capital requirement may
also depend on the growth rate of assets; this would help banks to strengthen
buﬀers in good times. In a dynamic setting, where equity is endogenous, there
is also a possibility that the capital requirement can limit the bank’s ability
30The use of a model with proper micro foundations instead of postulated behavioral
functions (no matter how plausible) would also mitigate the extent of the Lucas critique,
which (taken literally) would invalidate a comparison across regulatory regimes.
37to extend credit because increasing the capital base may be more costly than
alternative funding sources at the margin (that is, as compared with the
deposit base). This is the case if there is a liquidity premium. In Aguiar
and Drumond (2007) for instance, households demand a liquidity premium
to hold bank capital. This,c o m b i n e dw i t has t a n d a r dﬁnancial accelerator
eﬀect, implies that introducing capital requirements signiﬁcantly ampliﬁes
monetary policy shocks through a liquidity premium eﬀect on the external
ﬁnance premium faced by ﬁrms. This ampliﬁcation eﬀe c ti sg r e a t e ru n d e r
Basel II than under Basel I regulatory rules. Determining the extent to which
these results hold with the type of credit market imperfections highlighted
in this paper is an important task for middle-income countries.
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